

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRPERSON

Respected Delegates

A very warm welcome to this session of the Research & Analysis Wing being simulated at Blue Bells Model School Model United Nations 2022. Model United Nations has played a crucial role in my intellectual and personal development and I sincerely hope that this conference will serve you similarly.

The primary purpose of this committee is to help you enhance your logical and reasoning skills. In addition to that, the executive board will do its best to assist you to develop a research acumen and gain a deeper understanding of the external and internal threats that face our country today.

This research note is a part of a series of documents that we would like you to read thoroughly. Feel free to reach out to me by email if you have any questions. Looking forward to a productive conference. See you all soon!

Warm Regards

Shivang Soni

[\(shivang.soni21@nludelhi.ac.in\)](mailto:shivang.soni21@nludelhi.ac.in)

A NOTE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE

A. Flow of Debate

We strongly feel that the sole purpose of procedural rules should be ensuring that the flow of debate is smooth and systematic. Currently, the Model UN circuit is characterized by elaborate and cumbersome rules of procedure that disrupt rather than ease the flow of debate. Thus, for the purposes of this committee, all debate would be carried out in a round table format wherein every member of the committee will get an opportunity to speak on every topic of discussion. This would be followed by a round of rebuttals. Additionally, there would be a simple provision for informal discussion and lobbying, whenever the committee seems necessary.

B. Directives

Any exercise of the committee's/portfolio's powers must be done through the medium of a 'Directive'. The directive can be overt or covert. Further, at different times in the Committee, the committee would be required to draft group directives. Group directives would be for the purpose of exercising RAW's mandate as a whole. They would be subsequently put to vote.

PORTFOLIO MANDATE

At the outset, we would like to make it clear that portfolio responsibilities will play a smaller role vis-a-vis the overall contribution to the committee in the marking scheme since certain portfolios will naturally disadvantage delegates due to a limited mandate. Furthermore, the roles mentioned below may not be in consonance with the actual functions and responsibilities of such portfolios.

1. National Security Advisor

The National Security Advisor (NSA) is tasked with regularly advising the Prime Minister of India on all matters relating to internal and external threats and opportunities to India. The NSA will have the power to direct any of the portfolios mandated with gathering intelligence to gather information or carry out an operation through a directive sent via the EB. However, such a member can refuse to carry out the directed task with reasons as a reply to the chit.

2. Chief of Army Staff

The De-Facto commander of the Indian Army.

3. Chief of the Air Staff

The De-Facto commander of the Indian Air Force.

4. Chief of the Naval Staff

The De-Facto commander of the Indian Navy.

5. Foreign Secretary

In-Charge of all matters relating to diplomatic relations and the United Nations.

6. Secretary (China)

Authorised to control all resources of the Research & Analysis wing in China.

7. Secretary (Pakistan)

Authorised to control all resources of the Research & Analysis wing in Pakistan.

8. Covert Envoys (Mossad, CIA, KGB, PSIA)

Covert Envoys are the chief coordinators for their respective intelligence agencies. They can use their power to write directives to request their intelligence agency for assistance in an operation or to gather information.

9. Director of Defence Space Agency

The agency is tasked with operating the space-warfare and Satellite Intelligence[6] assets of India.

10. Secretary (Counter Terrorism)

Enjoys full control over all counter-terrorism and counter radicalisation operations.

11. Director of Intelligence Bureau (IB)

Until 1968, it handled both domestic and foreign intelligence after which the Research and Analysis Wing was formed specifically for foreign intelligence following that IB was primarily assigned the role of domestic intelligence and internal security.

12. Secretary (Bangladesh)

Authorised to control all resources of the Research & Analysis wing in Bangladesh.

13. Secretary (Nepal)

Authorised to control all resources of the Research & Analysis wing in Nepal.

14. Secretary (Sri Lanka)

Authorised to control all resources of the Research & Analysis wing in Sri Lanka.

15. Secretary (Myanmar)

Authorised to control all resources of the Research & Analysis wing in Myanmar.

16. Secretary (Afghanistan)

Authorised to control all resources of the Research & Analysis wing in Afghanistan.

17. Secretary (Bhutan)

Authorised to control all resources of the Research & Analysis wing in Bhutan.

Introduction to the Agenda

India faces multiple threats in the contemporary global set-up. The most dangerous among these is India's conflict with China. The primary theme of this session would be the growing Chinese influence on India's neighbours.

The History of Indo-China Relations

India became independent two years before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secured power in China in 1949. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, initially conceived of a synergistic relationship between New Delhi and Beijing: Both countries had huge populations and immense developmental challenges and were thus natural partners. China and India also shared a wariness of Western political meddling. **India, in fact, was the first non-communist state to formally recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC).** In 1954, talks in Beijing between Premier Zhou Enlai and an Indian government delegation resulted in the signing of the Panchsheel Agreement, which formally envisioned "peaceful coexistence" between China and India.

By the latter parts of the decade, the relationship was showing strains. In 1956, the CCP promulgated its first official map of China and the surrounding area, rejecting the **McMahon line** first demarcated by the British colonial authorities in 1914. The map showed large swathes of Indian territory within the borders of China. The Indian government reacted angrily, accusing the CCP of arbitrarily extending China's borders. In 1958, to improve Chinese leverage in the altercation, the CCP ordered the covert construction of a network of roads. The Indian response - the construction of military posts along the McMahon line - proved unacceptable to the Chinese.

In October 1962, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched a preemptive assault, obliterating India's weak and unorganised defences. After a month of intense fighting, China declared a unilateral ceasefire. The PLA withdrew from some of the conquered areas but retained over 38,000 square kilometres of disputed territory. Diplomatic and economic relations between Beijing and New Delhi collapsed after the 1962 war broke out, with Nehru reportedly feeling betrayed. He could not believe that Chinese leaders would so brutally repudiate his friendly approach.

In 1971, India supported East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) in its war of secession from Pakistan. The role India played in the partition of Pakistan - a close ally of China - and its refusal to renounce its nuclear ambitions, put China on guard. In the summer of 1974, India detonated an underground atomic device, proving its nuclear-weapon capabilities. Although Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1967-1977; 1980-1984) ordered the 1974 test, she also pursued the renewal of the Beijing-New Delhi diplomatic relationship. Ambassadorial-level relations were restored in 1976. Although diplomatic tension re-emerged as a corollary of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, this was merely a small bump in relations; in 1980, Indira Gandhi returned to power and met with the Chinese premier, reaffirming her desire to maintain friendly ties with Beijing. She also indicated that she shared the Chinese aspiration for greater economic cooperation. China and India granted one another Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status in August 1984. Nonetheless, as late as 1990, bilateral trade amounted to a mere \$190 million.

Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1988), more than any other Indian prime minister, focused his diplomatic efforts on reconciliation with China. In 1988, he made an historic visit to Beijing, the first prime ministerial visit in thirty-four years. These overtures led to the creation of a Joint Working Group (JWG) to address the border issue. Rajiv Gandhi and the CCP leadership also signed several scientific and cultural exchange agreements during this meeting. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) continued Rajiv Gandhi's diplomatic efforts. In 1993, Rao and Jiang Zemin signed an agreement for "the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They also set up the India-China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officers, tasked with advising the JWG. These diplomatic steps led both the CCP and the Indian parliament to ratify mutual troop reductions along the LAC in 1997. Starting in the mid- 1990s, China also began to adopt more even-handed rhetoric in discussing Indo-Pakistani relations, and the issue of Kashmir in particular.

The incremental advances made in Sino-Indian diplomacy were dramatically set back after India conducted tests of its nuclear weapons in 1998. A letter, sent by Prime Minister Vajpayee (1996; 1998-2004) to U.S. President Bill Clinton, was leaked to the New York Times. In the same, Vajpayee defended the nuclear tests by pointing to China as a potential threat to Indian security. The Chinese government repudiated Vajpayee's reasoning, calling his justification "utterly groundless." China then declared Pakistan's nuclear tests a necessary "reaction" to India's "hegemonic designs." Beijing also expressed discontent by cancelling the annual JWG meeting. However, shortly afterwards, India commenced a conscious process of re-establishing relations with China. There were several high-level meetings between the leaders of both countries, and the nuclear issue was put firmly on the back burner. When India and Pakistan were embroiled in a short, sharp war in the summer of 1999, China refrained from overt support for the latter. In 2006, a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation was signed during the Indian Defence Minister's visit to China. The agreement increased the number of military exchanges between the armed forces of the two countries. The move was hailed in India and abroad as facilitating a joint concentration on economic growth. The Chinese defence and foreign ministers made specific reference on the occasion to the goal of promoting prosperity in the region.

However, by the latter end of the 2000s the relationship between the countries had started souring again. It was observed in China that its economy and, consequently, its comprehensive national power had grown substantially and their reach for markets and resources had also increased the pressure for more involvement in global affairs. A reassessment of the policy of keeping a low profile internationally was carried out, and the need for achieving far greater things was felt. The Global Financial Crisis of 2009 paved the way for China to have a greater impact internationally. The idea of being nation-first, passively adapting to global events gave way to a policy shaped around active participation in shaping the global environment.

The drastic shift in China's foreign policy happened without keeping in mind India's possible reaction to the same. While both the countries were mostly moving together in the international sphere up until that point, it became evident that China did not regard India as particularly important in its path to global dominance. While China wanted any issues arising out of their foreign policy to be tackled bilaterally, the rising Indian relations with the USA raised the tensions between the neighbours. Further, around the early 2010s, both the countries started to get into

frequent disagreements over the territorial issue of Jammu and Kashmir. Conversely, while Indian foreign policy also hinged on greater relevance in the international sphere, their plans involved China as an important factor. Hence, this lack of reciprocity by the Chinese irked India to no limit.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi instituted a new direction in Indian foreign policy, China's perception that New Delhi was trying to contain China hardened. Despite the Modi government's desire to continue the previous administration's emphasis on strong Sino-Indian relations, its Neighbourhood First policy and closer ties with the United States were perceived negatively in China. Corresponding with these perceptions was Beijing's growing assertiveness vis-à-vis India, symbolised in the 2017 border standoff at Doklam and China's increased naval activity in the Indian Ocean. These actions convinced New Delhi that despite its efforts, China was not sensitive to India's international interests while also building a negative impression of Chinese President Xi Jinping's government. Hence, by 2018, misperception and mistrust became a pervasive feature of Sino-Indian relations.

Conclusion

This background note has been designed to give the delegates only a summary of the events at play that have led to the recent incidents, such as the Galwan Valley clashes and the ensuing hostility. A clear understanding of all India-China conflicts that have occurred in the past three years is essential for performing well in the conference.